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NOTE
#BLOCKEDBYTRUMP: WHY A GOVERNMENT-RUN SOCIAL
MEDIA PAGE ON A PRIVATELY-RUN PLATFORM
CANNOT BE A PUBLIC FORUM
A. J. Colkitt†
ABSTRACT
Ten years ago, it would have been hard to imagine regular news stories
opening with the phrase, “The President announced in a tweet today.” Yet in
today’s reality, use of social media is an increasingly accepted norm for
government officials. Although the concept may sound juvenile on the
surface, the use of social networking platforms has been gaining more and
more traction among public officials in the United States. With this rise in
popularity, it is inevitable that tough legal issues will arise. In particular,
social media has challenged courts to determine exactly what protections
should be afforded to both public officials and users of social media
platforms.
As private companies, social media websites maintain an immense
amount of control over their platforms and the users of their websites. Not
only may these companies restrict the speech of their users and suspend any
user’s account, but the terms that users agree to follow are also subject to
change at any time. This is because, since these companies are not
government agents, users are not guaranteed a right to free speech on the
companies’ respective platforms.
Despite the control that these private companies may exercise over their
users, the District Court for the Southern District of New York held that the
doctrine of public forum applies to the Twitter account run by President
Donald Trump. Specifically, the court held that the President designated the
space as a place where the public could converse without government
restriction. Thus, the court held that President Trump violated the plaintiffs’
First Amendment rights when he blocked their accounts from viewing and
commenting on his posts.

† A.J. Colkitt, Juris Doctor Candidate, Liberty University School of Law, May 2020. I
would like to thank my amazing wife, family, and mentors for all of their help and
encouragement through the process of writing this Note. All of your support has been
instrumental.
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This ruling could have a devastating impact on the law of public forum
and the general public’s First Amendment rights. By classifying a
government-run social media page as a public forum, the court gave private
companies the authority to restrict the speech of citizens in a public forum.
Because Twitter is not a government entity, the restrictions that it places on
its users are not subject to the same strict scrutiny as any restrictions imposed
by a public employee. Such a rule would grant private companies the right to
censor individuals in a way that would not be permissible if the government
attempted to do the same. This would open a dangerous door to privatized
censorship.
Because the website owners have discretion to impose limits on their users,
it is unreasonable to hold that a user has a guaranteed right to free speech on
the platform. Thus, instead of categorizing government-run social media
pages as a public forum, courts should limit public figures’ use of social media
to the exercise of government speech. Such a limited rule would retain the
majority of the benefits of government social media use while eliminating the
immense risk of privatized censorship. Under this rule, officials’ social media
pages and posts would be treated in the same way as all other government
speech.
I. INTRODUCTION
Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, Instagram, Snapchat, Reddit—the neverending list of social media platforms can be difficult to keep up with at times.
However, it is undeniable that the Internet has made it far easier for people
across the globe to interact with one another. In recent years, government
officials have taken to social networking sites to communicate with their
constituents. This trend is not limited to the United States; governments
around the world are increasingly making use of this new mode of
communication. In fact, in 2014, twenty-six out of thirty-four member
countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
reported that their executive officials had created official social media
accounts to communicate to the masses.1 Such use of social networking sites
has proven incredibly beneficial, as government officials can disseminate
information to their constituents in a quick and easy manner.2 However, with
this new use of social media, it is inevitable that this “official” use of social
media creates novel and complex legal questions. Chief among these

1. Arthur Mickoleit, Social Media Use by Governments: A Policy Primer To Discuss Trends,
Identify Policy Opportunities and Guide Decision Makers 2 (Org. for Econ. Co-operation and
Dev., Working Papers on Pub. Governance No. 26, 2014).
2. Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1975, 2004 (2011).
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questions is the foundational inquiry: how should courts treat governmentrun social media pages?
In March 2018, the Second Circuit attempted to answer precisely this
question in Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University v.
Trump, where the Second Circuit held that the Twitter page
@realDonaldTrump is a “designated public forum.”3 This means that
government officials who operate “official” social media pages of government
officials, such as President Donald Trump, would not have the constitutional
authority to “block” accounts from accessing and interacting with their page
on the basis of disagreeing with the commenter, as it would be considered
impermissible viewpoint discrimination.4
On the surface, such a restriction seems reasonable; after all, it would seem
in the government’s best interest to protect freedom of speech by allowing all
members of the public to view and sound off on this platform. On the other
hand, should this standard be applied uniformly, this precedent could grant
private individuals and institutions the power to significantly restrict the
public’s access to a forum specifically designed to be open to the public. Given
the immense amount of power and control that the sites hold over the users
and pages on their platform, users may be denied access to public fora
without the benefit of due process. Thus, instead of applying the confusing
and ill-fitting classification of “public forum” to government-run social
media pages, courts should not treat these pages as an area to converse;
rather, these accounts should only be used as a means to disseminate
government speech to the general public.
II. BACKGROUND
Before analyzing the impact of the application of the public forum
doctrine on social media platforms, there must be an understanding of the
often-confusing foundations of both public fora and social networking
websites. Specifically, it is vital to understand first, what constitutes a public
forum, how social media sites are structured for the users and for the
companies controlling the platform, and how the doctrine of public fora has
already been applied to pages created by public officials wishing to
communicate with their constituents.

3. Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir.
2019).
4. Id. at 234.
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Law of Public Fora

An analysis of government-run social media pages requires an
understanding of the jurisprudence surrounding public fora. The public
forum protects individuals from government censorship and exists where
“government property has by law or tradition been given the status of a public
forum.”5 Where a public forum exists, the government may only place
“content neutral, time, place, and manner restrictions or content-based”
restrictions on the individual’s speech.6 Content-based restrictions, however,
must be subject to strict scrutiny.7
The Supreme Court has recognized that there are three ways that property
can be construed as a public forum by either tradition or law.8 The first
avenue involves spaces that have been open for public discourse by virtue of
“long tradition or by government fiat.”9 These traditional public fora include
sidewalks, public parks, and other areas that are considered “quintessential”
public areas.10 The second avenue identified by the Supreme Court is nonpublic fora.11 This category is reserved for instances where the government
specifically opens a piece of public property not generally considered a public
forum.12 Finally, the Supreme Court has recognized that the government may
create a designated public forum.13
In this last category, the government may “create a public forum, for
purposes of the First Amendment free speech protections, by its designation
of a place or channel of communication for use by the public at large for
assembly and speech, for use by certain speakers, or for discussion of certain
subjects.”14 Here, the government must deliberately open a place for the
public to engage in expressive activity.15 This designation cannot be
unintentional.16 Furthermore, the government must specifically intend to
“make the property generally available to a class of speakers.”17 While the
government may limit the public forum to a specific class, a public forum is
5. 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 540 (2009).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983).
9. Id. at 45.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 46.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 45.
14. 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 541 (1979).
15. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
16. Ark. Educ. Tv Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 679 (1998) (citations omitted).
17. Id. at 679 (citations omitted).
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not created when only specific members of the class are granted permission
to use the designated public forum.18
While a public forum generally exists on government-owned property, the
Supreme Court has also found that a designated public forum can be created
on private property.19 This, however, is only reserved for limited
circumstances: the private property must be controlled in such a way that the
property has adopted the functions and workings of a town government.20
This would include residential buildings, sewage systems, and business
blocks.21 Thus, as a general matter, public fora are limited to places where the
government has control over the premises. However, a designated public
forum can exist in one other context: the government must exercise control
over the property that is intended for public discourse.22 This analysis may
apply to property in the government’s charge, even if the government does
not have legal title to the property.23 The Supreme Court held that private
property can be a public forum if the government exercises sufficient control
over the property and opens the property for public discourse.24 Therefore,
the doctrine of designated public fora may apply to private property when
the property is intentionally open to public discourse and subject to
government control, regardless of actual government ownership.
Nature of Social Media Platforms

B.

While a public forum may be created on private property, social
networking sites have proven difficult to categorize. Unlike private property
typically converted to a public forum, the Internet has no physical space that
may be occupied by either the government or individuals wishing to express
themselves. However, the Supreme Court has not found this problematic and
has held that a “metaphysical” public forum can be created.25 While this may
seem reasonable on the surface, the categorization of social media sites poses
multiple issues that are not readily apparent. First, in order to participate in
social media platforms, users must agree to the platform’s respective terms of

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
Id. at 516 (citing Marsh, 326 U.S. at 502).
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 801 (1985).
Id.
Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975).
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995).
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service.26 For example, sending a tweet or responding to another user’s tweet
on Twitter requires the user first to have an account. By clicking the “sign up”
button, users are met with a message that reads, “By signing up, you agree to
the Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, including Cookie Use.”27 Similarly,
users creating a Facebook account are informed that, by signing up, they
agree to the “Terms, Data Policy and Cookies Policy.”28
Both Twitter and Facebook present a “take-it-or-leave-it” contract to the
users that leaves no room for negotiation. Failure to follow these terms could
potentially result in an indefinite ban of the user’s account from the
respective platform.29 The second and even more concerning consideration
is the fact that the terms of service are constantly subject to change.30 In
particular, both platforms have expressly reserved, within their terms of
service, the right to amend the terms at any time.31 In an official public post,
Twitter even explained that their policies are a “living document” and that
Twitter is constantly “working to update, refine, and improve both our
enforcement and our policies, informed by in-depth research around trends
in online behavior both on and off Twitter, feedback from the people who
use Twitter, and input from a number of external entities, including members
of our Trust & Safety Council.”32 This means that a user’s conduct may
conform to the platform’s rules one day and the next be the cause of their
account’s indefinite removal from the platform.33
After agreeing to the Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, users are given
the ability to create their profile and begin interacting on the platform. Once
users create their profile, they may create “posts” using their account. These
26. See Twitter Terms of Service, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/en/tos (last visited Oct. 27,
2018); Terms of Service, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/terms.php (last visited Oct. 27,
2018).
27. Create Your Account, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/i/flow/signup (last visited Oct. 27,
2018).
28. “Sign Up,” FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com (last visited Oct. 27, 2018).
29. See Twitter Terms of Service, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/en/tos (last visited Oct. 27,
2018); Terms of Service, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/terms.php (last visited Oct. 27,
2018).
30. See Twitter Terms of Service, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/en/tos (last visited Oct. 27,
2018); Terms of Service, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/terms.php (last visited Oct. 27,
2018).
31. Twitter Terms of Service, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/en/tos (last visited Oct. 27,
2018); Terms of Service, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/terms.php (last visited Oct. 27,
2018).
32. Del Harvey, The Twitter Rules: A Living Document, TWITTER (Aug. 7, 2018),
https://blog.twitter.com/official/en_us/topics/company/2018/TheTwitterRulesALivingDocu
ment.html.
33. See id.
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posts, once created, are then distributed by the platform so that, depending
on the user’s privacy settings, others with accounts may view the post and
potentially respond to the user. The ability to post and comment on the
platform, however, raises an odd question that must be asked about the page
itself: who is responsible for the information and content of the post? There
is a strange dichotomy to social media platforms, in that the sites themselves
publish the posts that users create, despite the fact that the platforms have not
“created” the speech themselves. In Sikhs for Justice “SFJ”, Inc. v. Facebook,
Inc., the plaintiff operated a page on Facebook that focused on the “plight of
religious minorities of India and their treatment by successive Indian
Governments and promotes independence for Sikhs in the Indian state of
Punjab.”34 However, Facebook blocked access to the plaintiff’s page in India.35
Facebook did so without providing any notice to the plaintiff.36
The plaintiff filed suit alleging that Facebook discriminated against the
plaintiff on the basis of “race, religion, ancestry, and national origin.”37
However, the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff failed to establish that
Facebook could be held liable for “discriminatory conduct” since Facebook
is merely a publisher of the plaintiff’s information.38 Under this standard, the
publisher is able to review, edit, and decide whether to publish or withdraw
any content from a third party.39 This is due to the immunity provided to
publishers under the Communications Decency Act.40 Thus, Facebook was
justified in refusing to publish the plaintiff’s content in India and, by
extension, remove users’ posts from their website altogether.41 This is because
this authority is within Facebook’s discretion as the publisher.42 Therefore,
because social media sites are merely publishers, social networking
companies, such as Facebook and Twitter, may outright refuse to give users
the ability to use their platforms to publish their posts or disseminate their
speech.
Once the user creates a post and the platform publishes the post on the
user’s profile, the post affords others the opportunity to directly respond to
34. See Sikhs for Justice “SFJ”, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 144 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1090 (N.D.
Cal. 2015), aff’d Sikhs for Justice, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 697 Fed. Appx. 526 (9th Cir. 2017)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1095.
39. Id. at 1094.
40. Sikhs, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 1094; 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2011).
41. Sikhs, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 1095–96.
42. Id.
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the content. This is done in an area called the “comment section.” This area
of the platform, however, may not be open to all people with an account on
the platform. Both Facebook and Twitter give the individual users the ability
to “block” other accounts from accessing the comment sections of their
posts.43 This understanding of how social media operates and how a “block”
impacts the users on the platform is foundational to understanding how the
courts have misunderstood the nature of the platform of social media and the
application of the doctrine of public forum to government-run pages.
C.

Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University v. Trump

In recent years, the realms of public fora and social media have intersected.
As the use of social media to communicate with a wide audience has become
increasingly prominent among government officials, courts have been faced
with the difficult task of classifying these government-run social media pages.
In May of 2018, the District Court for the Southern District of New York held
that Twitter accounts and the ability to directly reply to tweets are classified
as a designated public forum.44
In Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University v. Trump, the
plaintiffs had been individually banned by President Trump from viewing
and commenting on the President’s tweets from his account
@realDonaldTrump.45 President Trump stipulated that the plaintiffs were
directly banned because they had been critical of the President and his
policies.46 As a result of President Trump’s block, the plaintiffs were unable
to view or directly reply to any of the tweets from the account
@realDonaldTrump.47 The Knight First Amendment Institute brought the
suit on the basis that it desired to “read comments that otherwise would have
been posted by the blocked plaintiffs, and by other accounts blocked by
@realDonaldTrump, in direct reply to @realDonaldTrump tweets . . . .”48
In analyzing the nature of the plaintiffs’ speech, the district court turned
to the application of the doctrine of public fora.49 Specifically, the court
narrowed its focus to the control that President Trump exercises over both
43. See How To Block Accounts on Twitter, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/usingtwitter/blocking-and-unblocking-accounts (last visited Jan. 12, 2019); Blocking People,
FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/290450221052800 (last visited Jan. 12, 2019).
44. Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) [hereinafter Knight].
45. Id. at 553.
46. Id. at 553–54.
47. Id. at 554.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 565.
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the posts and the ability to prevent others from using the comment sections
to the posts made by his account @realDonaldTrump.50 The court found that
President Trump and the White House Director of Social Media Dan Scavino
had sufficient governmental control over the account.51 While the opinion
mentioned in passing the fact that Twitter is a “private” company that
maintains control over “all . . . Twitter accounts,” the court was more
interested in the amount of control that the government exercised over the
content of the tweets and accounts authorized to interact with the tweets
from the account.52 In particular, the court found that President Trump and
Director Scavino’s ability to create the content of each tweet and block
specific accounts from viewing and responding to the tweets published by the
account was sufficient to establish government control over the account
@realDonaldTrump.53
Additionally, the court held that the President intended to create a
designated public forum.54 This was because Scavino had previously told the
general public that the President’s account was to be used “as a means
through which the President ‘communicates directly with you, the American
people!’”55 While neither Scavino nor President Trump mentioned that the
account could be used for the public to communicate back to the President,
the Second Circuit analyzed the nature of the platform to determine the
intent of President Trump.56 Specifically, the court looked to the Supreme
Court where the Court held that Twitter could be used to “petition their
elected representatives and otherwise engage with them in a direct manner.”57
As previously mentioned, a designated public forum can exist if the
opportunity to speak is generally available to a class of speakers.58 The court
in Knight seemed to insinuate that the class of speakers designated for the
comment section was either the general public or individuals with a Twitter
account.59
In its analysis, the court examined several factors, including the
President’s “policy and past practice, as well as the nature of the property and

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Knight, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 566–67.
Id. at 566.
Id. at 566–67.
Id.
Id. at 574.
Id.
See Knight, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 574.
Id. (citing Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017)).
Id.
Id.
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its compatibility with expressive activity.”60 To the policy and practice, the
court pointed to statements made by Director Scavino where he represented
to the people that the account was a means by which the President could
communicate directly with the masses.61 Further, the court held that the
account itself and the posts made by the account were accessible to the
general public, provided that they had a Twitter account and were not
blocked from the President’s own Twitter account.62
In analyzing the nature and compatibility of the account in question, the
court held that “the interactive space of a tweet can accommodate an
unlimited number of replies and retweets.”63 This, the court held, was more
than sufficient to establish the requisite interactivity and compatibility with
the “intended” use.64 Thus, due to the specific designation of the “open”
space, the government control over the space, and the apparent intent to
open the account to public discourse, the court held that the Twitter account
@realDonaldTrump was a designated public forum.65 Because of this
classification, the court held that the ban on the plaintiffs’ accounts was
impermissible viewpoint discrimination, inconsistent with the First
Amendment.66 Thus, the court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.67
Here, the court recognized another vital point: posts created by President
Trump were not susceptible to the analysis under the doctrine of public
forum.68 This was because the President’s posts constituted “government
speech.”69 Based on the facts of the record, the court concluded that President
Trump used the account to “announce, describe, and defend his policies; to
promote his Administration’s legislative agenda; to announce official
decisions; to engage with foreign political leaders; to publicize state visits; to
challenge media organizations whose coverage of his Administration he
believes to be unfair; and for other statements . . . .”70
All of these uses were consistent with the three requirements for
government speech: First, the tweets were used to convey a state message.71
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. (quoting Paulsen v. County of Nassau, 925 F.2d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 1991)).
Knight, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 574.
Id.
Id. at 573.
Id. at 574–75.
Id. at 574.
Id. at 577.
Knight, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 580.
Id. at 571.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Second, the posts were often closely identified with the government, since the
President himself or his staff was creating and disseminating the posts.72
Finally, the President maintained direct control over the content of the
posts.73 In so ruling, the court held that public officials might use social media
accounts to disseminate official government speech to the public.74 While this
holding is collateral to the ruling that the comment section is a public forum,
in general, it is monumental for determining the classification of government
use of social media.
D.

Second Circuit Appeal

Soon after the ruling, President Trump appealed the decision arguing that
the Twitter account @realDonaldTrump was a personal account that had no
element of government control.75 Specifically, President Trump contended
that he had created the account prior to his run for, and subsequent election
to, public office.76 According to President Trump, the mere fact that he
became a public official did not transform his account into a governmentrun platform for the purpose of public forum analysis.77 Regarding the
platform itself, President Trump asserted that “Twitter as a whole could be
characterized as a private forum for public expression—though not a ‘public
forum’ in the First Amendment sense, given its non-governmental
character.”78 Presumably, the individual pages on the platform that are run
by government entities or officials could be classified as a public forum given
the amount of government control.
In response to the President’s brief, Knight First Amendment Institute at
Columbia University argued that President Trump used the account
@realDonaldTrump in his official governmental capacity.79 Knight argued
that because the Twitter account allowed the public to “hear from the
President about matters relating to government, respond to him directly, and
engage with one another about his and his administration’s statements and
policies,” the President’s use of Twitter constituted official government use.80
72. Id.
73. Knight, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 571.
74. Id.
75. Brief for Appellants at 19, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump,
928 F.3d 226 (2nd Cir. Aug. 7, 2018) (No. 18-1691).
76. Id. at 22.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 32.
79. Brief for Appellees at 12, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump,
928 F.3d 226 (2nd Cir. Oct. 12, 2018) (No. 18-1691).
80. Id. at 12–13.
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This would place the decision to block the plaintiffs from accessing his
account within the First Amendment.81 Therefore, because the President
outright admitted to blocking the plaintiffs based on their expressed
disagreement with his policies,82 the action was improper viewpoint
discrimination.83
After hearing oral arguments, the Second Circuit affirmed the lower
court’s decision that President Trump created a public forum in the space of
his Twitter account.84 The court began its analysis by examining the nature
of public fora and the First Amendment.85 The court recognized several
principles from the Supreme Court: First, social media platforms could be
used for First Amendment expression.86 Second, basic principles of the First
Amendment do not vary when a new mode of communication is used.87
Finally, a public forum can exist absent a physical location and can exist in a
metaphysical forum.88
Taking all three of these principles together, the Second Circuit examined
whether a public forum was created by President Trump.89 The court adopted
the Supreme Court test in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Education
Fund and examined both “the nature of the property and its compatibility
with expressive activity to discern the government’s intent” and whether the
government opened the forum for indiscriminate use by the public.90 From
the outset, the court rejected President Trump’s claim that he merely
exercised control over his private, personal account and instead held that the
account was government-controlled property.91 This followed a particularly
noteworthy concession by President Trump on oral argument that the
account is not “independent of [his] presidency.”92 Because of this
81. Id. at 13.
82. See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541,
553–55 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
83. Brief for Appellees at 13, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump,
No. 18-1691 (2nd Cir. Oct. 12, 2018) (No. 18-1691).
84. Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 233–34 (2d
Cir. 2019).
85. Id. at 237.
86. Id. (citing Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735–36 (2017)).
87. Id. (quoting Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011)).
88. Id. (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 830
(1995)).
89. Id.
90. Knight, 928 F.3d at 237 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473
U.S. 788, 802 (1985); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983)).
91. Id. at 236.
92. Id. at 231.
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connection, the court held that the President’s conduct created the public
forum because the account and interactive comment section were
intentionally opened for public discussion without limitation.93 Thus, when
President Trump burdened the speech of the plaintiffs, he engaged in
impermissible viewpoint discrimination.94
Oddly, the Second Circuit seemed to expressly ignore the question of
whether a public forum can even exist when a private entity maintains
pervasive control over the platform and speech of its users.95 The court
overtly stated that it would not consider “whether private social media
companies are bound by the First Amendment when policing their
platforms.”96 Instead, the Second Circuit zeroed in on whether a public
official may exclude individuals from participating in an online dialogue that
would have been “otherwise-open.”97 However, in their characterization and
description of Twitter as a platform, the court did not even acknowledge
Twitter’s ability to block, remove, or delete content posted by its users.98
In the final paragraph of its opinion, the Second Circuit leaves the reader
with a short philosophical dissertation. The court noted the “irony” of the
litigants’ timing given the passion and robustness of modern debate.99 Thus,
the court made it a point to acknowledge the importance of freedom of
expression, especially in public discourse.100 In its parting words, the Second
Circuit gave a direct message to the President, the plaintiffs, and the public
as a whole: “In resolving this appeal, we remind the litigants and the public
that if the First Amendment means anything, it means that the best response
to disfavored speech on matters of public concern is more speech, not less.”101
E.

Post-Knight Response

Since the lower court’s ruling in Knight, reception of the new rule among
the courts has generally been positive. In the same jurisdiction, the court for
the Southern District of New York has already begun to lay the foundation
to adopt this rule on a widespread level.102 In Price v. City of New York, the
93. Id. at 237.
94. Id. at 238.
95. Id. at 230.
96. Knight, 928 F.3d at 230.
97. Id.
98. See id. at 230–31.
99. Id. at 240.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See Price v. City of N.Y., No. 15 Civ. 5871 (KPF), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105815, at
*25 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2018).
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plaintiff began posting critical comments on @NYPD28Pct, the 28th Precinct
of the New York Police Department’s Twitter account.103 In response, the
plaintiff was blocked from the account and could no longer use her account
to comment on any of the tweets posted by @NYPD28Pct.104 In bringing a
suit against the precinct, the plaintiff alleged that her First Amendment rights
were violated since the government itself engaged in viewpoint
discrimination by prohibiting her from voicing her opinions on the site.105
While the court did not employ the Knight test, this was merely because the
plaintiff failed to frame her argument “in a manner that tracks the analysis in
[Knight].”106 Had the plaintiff done so, it seems that the court would have
adopted the analysis to determine the outcome.107
The impact of Knight, however, has not been limited to the Southern
District of New York, or even the Second Circuit. In Davison v. Randall, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals also adopted a path of analysis similar to
that of the Second Circuit.108 The public official in question, Phyllis Randall,
was the chair for the Loudoun County Board of Supervisors.109 Instead of
creating a Twitter account, Ms. Randall created a Facebook Page devoted to
her campaign and labeled it under the tag of “government official.”110 After
creating the Page, in a similar way to President Trump, Ms. Randall elicited
public discussion on her Page by stating “I really want to hear from ANY
Loudoun citizen on ANY issues, request, criticism, complement or just your
thoughts.”111 However, when the plaintiff began to criticize Ms. Randall on
the Page, Ms. Randall deleted a critical post that the plaintiff left on the Page
and blocked the plaintiff’s account from viewing and commenting on the
Page.112 The plaintiff brought suit alleging a violation of the First
Amendment.113
In response, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals created a framework that
is strikingly similar to the framework created in Knight.114 First, the Fourth
Circuit concluded that Ms. Randall’s overt declaration that the space was
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at *7.
Id. at *7–8.
Id. at *24–25.
Id. at *27–28.
See id.
Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666 (4th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 673.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 675–76.
Id. at 676.
See Davison, 912 F.3d at 683–84.
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intended to be used by the general public was sufficient to demonstrate that
the public official intended to create the forum.115 This, the court
acknowledged, was significant considering that the Page and Facebook were,
in general, compatible with expressive activity.116 Also, the court cited to 47
U.S.C. § 230(a)(3) to bolster its conclusion that “the internet” is “a forum for
a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural
development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity.”117
Second, the majority concluded that the Page was subject to government
control since Ms. Randall maintained “significant control” over the relevant
aspects of the Page.118 This is because Ms. Randall “had authority to ban
Facebook profiles or Pages from using the Chair’s Facebook Page—and,
therefore, the interactive component of the page—authority she exercised in
banning [the defendant’s account].”119 These findings led the court to
conclude that, like the @realDonaldTrump account, the Page was a public
forum, and the block was impermissible viewpoint discrimination.120
Davison demonstrates that the trend that began in Knight is already
becoming widespread and, in all likelihood, will be an issue that will be heard
by the United States Supreme Court soon.
III. LONG-TERM IMPACT OF KNIGHT
With these new rulings from the Second and Fourth Circuit, Knight could
signal a significant change in public forum jurisprudence that would have a
wide-reaching impact on the use of private social media platforms. This rule
would apply to more than accounts owned by single individuals, as President
Trump asserted in his appellate brief.121 This rule would apply to all
government-run social media accounts. In fact, even though the Second
Circuit only decided Knight within the past year, there have already been
significant cases that have adopted the court’s approach to government-run
social media pages. Given how popular the use of social media has become
among government actors, it is time to take a step back and look at the
broader scope of the impact a rule like this could generate. This section will
identify potential negative impacts that may arise from the rule that
government-run social media pages should be classified as public fora.
115. Id. at 682.
116. Id.
117. Id. (quoting Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997)). It is
important to note that “the internet” is a vastly different subject than “social media sites.”
118. Id. at 683.
119. Id. at 684.
120. Davison, 912 F.3d at 688.
121. See generally Brief for Appellants at 32, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia
Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226 (2nd Cir. Aug. 7, 2018) (No. 18-1691).
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In analyzing the application of the doctrine of public fora to social media
pages, there are three areas that are a cause for concern. First, private
companies operating social media sites retain a troubling amount of control
over their pages and users. While it may be true that the government
maintains some control over these social media pages, there is a significant
distinguishing factor between the social media pages here and other public
fora: the companies that own the platforms maintain a higher degree of
private control over the speech that takes place within their platform.
Specifically, the control that is reserved by social network sites is so great that
no page, post, or even comment section can possibly be classified as a public
forum.
The second concern involves the ever-changing, take-it-or-leave-it terms
of service. These terms subject the users of the respective platforms to some
odd and, at times, concerning requirements in order to not be permanently
banned from the platform. Finally, there are significant privacy concerns
revolving around the users’ data stored on the site. In order for a member of
the general public to participate in the public forum, they must subject
themselves to potentially invasive data mining and targeted advertising, all
for the benefit of the private company. Therefore, contrary to the Second
Circuit’s assertion, dialogue on social media platforms cannot be classified as
“otherwise-open.”122
A.

Private Control over Public Fora

The first issue that should be taken into account is the level of control that
private companies retain over these so-called public fora. As previously
mentioned, a threshold issue for a public forum analysis is whether the
government retains sufficient control over the forum in question.123
However, courts have not sufficiently discussed the massive amount of
control that the social media sites retain over the government’s social media
page and its comment section. Any analysis that has been directed toward the
issue has been cursory at best. For example, the Southern District of New
York in Knight only made brief mention of this concern in a passing
comment.124 The court noted that even though Twitter is “a private (though
publicly traded) company” that owns the platform, it did not give any
consideration to the amount of control that the company has over its users’
122. Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 230 (2d
Cir. 2019).
123. See Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 553 (1975).
124. Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541,
566 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
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speech and ability to participate on the platform.125 Instead, the bulk of the
analysis focused on the control that Twitter shares with the user—in this case,
President Trump.126 However, the power given to the “owner” of the account
is only derived from the power that Twitter inherently holds over its users.
The Second Circuit in Knight and the Fourth Circuit in Davison relied
heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal
Defense & Education Fund to conclude that a public forum may exist on
private property.127 However, as noted by the Southern District of New York
in Knight, this does not mean that the control element is ignored; rather, the
government must still maintain sufficient control over the forum in
question.128 Unfortunately, the Knight court and the Davison court gave no
consideration to the concurrent control that the account holder and private
company share over the account.129 This is because the Supreme Court has
not analyzed a scenario where the government and a private entity have
concurrent control over the speech of those participating in the forum in
question. Instead, the Court has focused on cases where the government has
exclusive control over the property and the ability to silence those on the
property.130 For example, a public forum may exist in a theater that is rented
by the government for expressive purposes.131 In the present issue, the “lease”
includes a provision that the legal owner of the forum may regulate the users’
speech. Even though the individual’s name appears on the social media
account, the private company maintains legal title over the page and may
revoke the individual’s privileges at any time.
This scenario presents an entirely novel question that must be taken into
account when determining the categorization of the property. Otherwise, this
rule could have a massive negative impact on all public fora going forward.
Picture a scenario where the government leases a building where the public
is free to converse and discuss issues with each other and government
officers. However, while the public is conversing, the person that owns the
building is listening to every conversation that is taking place and has the
ability to throw out the individuals who violate his own personal rules
without due process. At this point, the restrictions that the private company
places on those utilizing the property are so pervasive that it distinguishes
itself from any other case that the Supreme Court has previously decided.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id.
See id. at 566–67.
Id. at 566; Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666, 683 (2019).
Knight, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 566.
See id. at 566–67; Davison, 912 F.3d at 682–83.
See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975).
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Thus, these additional restrictions must be considered when applying the
doctrine of public fora to these Internet platforms.
Further, the terms of service that all users must agree to before they create
an account on the platform are also binding on the government officials that
create a profile. Once an account is created on Twitter, the user must enter
into a contract with the private company (Twitter) before being allowed to
participate in the forum “designated” by the government. These terms
expressly identify the types of speech that may not be disseminated on their
platform.132 Because of this, the private company becomes a gatekeeper to the
public fora. This is more than the government simply renting an area for use;
now, Twitter and Facebook serve as “bouncers” to the public fora before
individuals can even participate in any discussion opened by the government
actor.
To put this idea in perspective, let’s say that a government official created
a completely government-run social media account, announced to the public
that the account would be used for the purpose of communicating to and
with the public, and posted the exact same content that President Trump
posted on Twitter. However, imagine that the platform in question was not
Facebook or Twitter; instead, the platform had an overt political or personal
bias in favor of the public official. While the official would be unable to block
a user from commenting on his posts, the owner of the website would have
the unlimited ability to completely remove users from the platform for
simply posting a contrary view to the official. Such a system would have the
potential to privatize censorship based on the website or platform where the
public official chooses to host their “forum.”
For example, if President Trump were to create a social media page on a
platform that was overtly biased toward his policies and ideals, there would
be nothing holding the platform back from deleting users’ comments and
banning overly critical users from their platform. While the President would
not be able to respond to criticism by blocking users, the platform owner
would have the unlimited authority to do just that. This is the crux of the
issue: with the amount of private control not even considered in social media
analysis, a rule like the one adopted by the Fourth Circuit in Knight would
open the door for a scenario where government officials are encouraged to
selectively choose the platform that they establish their social media account
on so that the platform may offer some amount of protection and censorship.

132. See 11. Hate Speech, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/
hate_speech (last accessed Aug. 31, 2019). Twitter’s version of the limitations is called “hateful
conduct.” Hateful Conduct Policy, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/
hateful-conduct-policy (last visited Aug. 31, 2019).
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Troubling Terms of Service

In addition to the amount of control that the platform owners wield over
the users of their own accounts, the reasons users may be banned from the
platform are subject to change at any point.133 In particular, the reserved
ability of the respective platforms to change the terms of service raises serious
concerns regarding the ability of the public to participate in the forums
designated by the government.
Before proceeding, one disclaimer must be made: the point of this analysis
is not to criticize social media platforms for their policies. As previously
stated, it is well within the respective platform’s rights to create these
restrictions on the use of their platforms. Instead, the purpose of this analysis
is to highlight the platforms’ freedom to restrict speech in a greater capacity
than the government. Such a system, while beneficial for a private company
in the free market of ideas, does not fit within concepts of public fora.
As previously mentioned, a user must first agree to a site’s lengthy Terms
of Service and Privacy Policies. However, in the event that an individual reads
every provision in the site’s terms, this would still not be enough for that user
to be adequately informed of what the terms may be for the foreseeable
future. While a user may agree to a current form of the site’s terms and
conditions, those terms are subject to change at any time. Facebook’s terms
warn the user that changes will be made “from time to time to accurately
reflect our services and practices.”134 According to Twitter, they also “may
revise these Terms from time to time.”135 These vaguely-worded provisions
can have a significant impact on those using the platform: there are no
guarantees as to what type of conduct or posts will be allowed on a site for
the long-term. In fact, the California Court of Appeals ruled in Twitter v. The
Superior Court for the City and County of San Francisco that Twitter may
permanently ban users’ accounts for violating new changes to the site’s terms
of service on the basis of a recent change in Twitter’s terms of service.136 This
illustrates that these social media sites may change their policies at any time

133. See Twitter Terms of Service, TWITTER (May 25, 2018), https://twitter.com/en/tos (last
visited Aug. 31, 2019); Terms of Service, FACEBOOK (Jul. 31, 2019), https://www.facebook.
com/terms.php (last visited Aug. 31, 2019).
134. Terms of Service, FACEBOOK (Jul. 31, 2019), https://www.facebook.com/terms.php
(last visited Aug. 31, 2019).
135. Twitter Terms of Service, TWITTER (May 25, 2018), https://twitter.com/en/tos (last
visited Aug. 31, 2019).
136. Twitter, Inc. v. Super. Ct. for S.F., 2018 Cal. App. LEXIS 1248, at *9–10 (No.
A154973) (order issuing alternative writ of mandate).
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and be legally justified in deactivating a user’s account on those grounds
alone.
When examining the specific terms of service on both Facebook and
Twitter, it quickly becomes apparent that these private companies reserve the
ability to exclude the speech of users for far more reasons than allowed by the
government under the First Amendment. In addition to the assortment of
non-speech-related reasons for account suspension, such as six months of
inactivity on Twitter’s platform,137 there are several speech-related
restrictions that users must agree to when creating a new account. For
example, in their respective terms of service, both Facebook and Twitter
reserve the right to exclude users from their platform if the user uses their
account to disseminate “hate speech.”138 Both platforms have defined this in
similar yet distinct ways. For example, Facebook’s Community Guidelines
have an entire article dedicated to the definition and tier-ranking of hate
speech, which Facebook defines as follows:
We define hate speech as a direct attack on people based on
what we call protected characteristics—race, ethnicity,
national origin, religious affiliation, sexual orientation,
caste, sex, gender, gender identity, and serious disease or
disability. We also provide some protections for
immigration status. We define attack as violent or
dehumanizing speech, statements of inferiority, or calls for
exclusion or segregation.139
In a similar way, Twitter defines hateful conduct as the promotion of
“violence against or direct[] . . . attack[s] or threat[s] [to] other people on the
basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, sexual orientation, gender, gender
identity, religious affiliation, age, disability, or serious disease.”140 All of these
definitions, while within the rights of the platforms to create, are incredibly
ambiguous. These restrictions limit the amount of freedom that its users may
exercise on the platforms. This could be incredibly problematic, especially

137. Inactive Account Policy, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/
inactive-twitter-accounts (last visited Aug. 31, 2019).
138. See 11. Hate Speech, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards
/hate_speech (last vistied Aug. 31, 2019); Hateful Conduct Policy, TWITTER, https://
help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/hateful-conduct-policy (last visited Aug. 31, 2019).
139. 11. Hate Speech, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/hate_
speech (last visited Aug. 31, 2019).
140. Hateful Conduct Policy, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/
hateful-conduct-policy (last visited Aug. 31, 2019).
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when the restrictions are in a place where First Amendment rights are
supposed to be guaranteed.
While it may seem counter-intuitive for social media platforms to ban
users from their site for the things that the user says, major social media
platforms have proven that they can and will exercise this right, even if the
user has a large following. In late 2018, talking head Alex Jones and his
organization, Infowars, were permanently banned from all of the most
popular social media platforms, including Facebook, Twitter, and
YouTube.141 This move resulted from a long history of Jones making wild and
unsubstantiated claims, including accusing the government of creating “gay
bomb[s]” and tainting the water with chemicals that “turn[] the friggin’ frogs
gay!”142 In one of his most disgusting claims, Jones asserted several times that
the Sandy Hook massacre was a “hoax” organized by the Obama
administration.143 These claims, while incredibly disturbing, are likely
protected under the First Amendment. As ridiculous and infuriating as some
of these claims are, it is highly unlikely that the government would be justified
in barring Jones from using his right to free speech in this manner.
This, however, does not bar private companies from limiting the type of
speech that takes place on their respective platforms. Beginning in the latter
half of 2018, several tech companies began to ban Jones from using their
platforms to disseminate his opinions.144 On August 6, 2018, Facebook
announced to the world that it had permanently banned all four of Alex
Jones’ accounts: “the Alex Jones Channel Page, the Alex Jones Page, the
InfoWars Page, and the Infowars Nightly News Page.”145 This, according to
141. Eli Blumenthal, Twitter Bans Conspiracy Theorist Alex Jones, Infowars from Social
Network for Violating “Abusive Behavior” Policy, USA TODAY (Sept. 6, 2018),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2018/09/06/twitter-bans-alex-jones-and-hisconspiracy-site-infowars/1216107002/.
142. Joe Sommerlad, Alex Jones: Who Is the Ranting Alt-Right Radio Host and What Are
His Craziest Conspiracy Theories?, INDEPENDENT (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.independent.co.
uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/alex-jones-radio-show-us-alt-right-conspiracy-theoriesyoutube-infowars-illuminati-frogs-a8483986.html. The footage of Jones making these claims,
which has been saved on YouTube for posterity, can only be seen to be believed. See Terrance
the Psychonaut, Alex Jones “Turning the Freaking Frogs Gay”, YOUTUBE (Feb. 18, 2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_ePLkAm8i2s.
143. Sommerlad, supra note 142.
144. Craig Timberg, Elizabeth Dwoskin & Hamza Shaban, Apple, Facebook and Other
Tech Companies Delete Content from Alex Jones, WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/08/06/apple-facebook-other-techcompanies-delete-content-alex-jones/?utm_term=f95d7ed8ec2f/.
145. Enforcing Our Community Standards, FACEBOOK: NEWSROOM (Aug. 6, 2018),
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/08/enforcing-our-community-standards/.
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Facebook, was because the accounts had ignored the warnings that were
given and the strikes that were placed on the accounts.146 These strikes were
due to the multiple violations of the community guidelines, including what
Facebook cited as “glorifying violence” and “dehumanizing language.”147
Eventually, the violations resulted in a ban on the accounts.148
Facebook was not alone in this move; Apple, Google, and Spotify removed
Jones from their respective platforms all within the same week.149 At the time,
there was one major platform that remained silent on the Alex Jones
controversy: Twitter.150 This, presumably, was because Twitter had come
under fire for seemingly targeting conservative accounts in a move to cut
down on “fake accounts and automated bot networks.”151 However, after
pressure from the community, Twitter suspended Jones’ accounts from
posting for seven days.152 Soon after, on September 6, 2018, Twitter
announced that they were permanently banning Alex Jones’ and Infowars’
account from the platform.153 This was because the accounts violated
Twitter’s “abusive behavior” policy.154 Twitter also announced that it would
“continue to evaluate reports we receive regarding other accounts potentially
associated with [Alex Jones] and will take action if content that violates our
rules is reported or if other accounts are utilized in an attempt to circumvent
their ban.”155
Actions like those taken by the aforementioned platforms in response to
Alex Jones are completely independent of the First Amendment. Such a ban
is well within the rights of the platforms; they have the freedom to limit access
to and usage of their platform. However, Jones’ claims would likely not be
censored by the government per the First Amendment. In the wake of the
Alex Jones ban, Jonathan Zittrain, faculty director of Harvard’s Berkman
Klein Center for Internet and Society, expressed some concern regarding the
control that the platforms exercise over its users:
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Timberg, supra note 144.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Sara Salinas, Twitter Permanently Bans Alex Jones and Infowars Accounts, CNBC
(Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/06/twitter-permanently-bans-alex-jones-andinfowars-accounts.html (last updated Sept. 7, 2018).
153. Twitter Safety (@TwitterSafety), TWITTER (Sept. 6, 2018, 1:47 PM), https://twitter.
com/TwitterSafety/status/1037804428877680640.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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While private platforms aren’t bound by the restrictions of
the First Amendment—generally only the government is—
there’s a question about how much discretion they should
choose to exercise over what speech they allow to flow
through them. That question can’t be wisely answered
without noting how unfortunately central just a few
intermediaries are—like Apple for podcasts, or YouTube,
Facebook and Twitter for videos and links.156
Zittrain is not alone in his sentiments. Chris Hughes, co-founder of
Facebook, has publicly decried the influence Facebook has on modern
culture and how much power rests in the platform’s algorithm.157 With such
a pervasive amount of control vested in a small group of companies, courts
should take pause when considering whether a public forum can truly exist
on platforms such as this.
This massive amount of power can be especially problematic if the
platforms begin to demonstrate a political bias. With the ban of Alex Jones
from major social media platforms, the Washington Post even expressed
concern that companies like Facebook and Twitter seemed to take more
partisan stances in their recent bans of users.158 The Post even noted that the
platforms have become increasingly willing to ban “abusive” speech “even at
the risk of impinging on free speech.”159 This was true for Alex Jones; even
the disgusting assertion that the Sandy Hook massacre was a hoax would
likely not be subjected to government censorship. Only a private company
would be constitutionally able to exclude Jones’ speech from its own
platform. In the context of the present discussion, this would mean that if a
public forum exists on these private platforms, the companies would have the
unchecked authority to allow or disallow any sort of speech they desire to
censor.
The power to exclude the speech of users even extends to government-run
pages. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu utilizes Facebook to
promulgate government speech to the masses.160 Since it is difficult to
156. Timberg, supra note 144.
157. Chris Hughes, It’s Time To Break up Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/09/opinion/sunday/chris-hughes-facebook-zuckerberg.
html. Hughes even suggested that it is time to “break up” Facebook. Id.
158. Timberg, supra note 144.
159. Id.
160. Isabel Kershner, Facebook Suspends Netanyahu Campaign Bot for Hate Speech, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/12/world/middleeast/facebooknetanyahu-bot.html (last updated Sept. 16, 2019).
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maintain an active social media account while running for reelection, the
Prime Minister utilizes a “chatbot” to help communicate to the public.
However, during his reelection campaign, the chatbot posted on Facebook
an incredibly disparaging comment regarding Prime Minister Netanyahu’s
opposition and the political left.161 Specifically, the chatbot called on users to
avoid voting for “Arabs who want to destroy us all—women, children and
men—and allow a nuclear Iran that will kill us.”162 Once again, while these
statements would likely be permissible under the First Amendment,
Facebook categorized the post as impermissible hate speech and suspended
the Prime Minister’s chatbot for twenty-four hours.163 A Facebook
spokesperson even cautioned that, if there are additional violations, further
action may be taken against Prime Minister Netanyahu’s account.164 Such
action is well within the purview of Facebook since they reserve the power to
shut down pages if they violate the terms of use.165 This further demonstrates
how little control even government actors have over their own accounts.
Because an analysis regarding the platform’s terms and limitations on its
users is fundamentally missing from both Knight and Davison, the rule that
was created by both the Second and Fourth Circuits would apply to all
websites, regardless of their limiting terms, political stance, or required
agreements for creating an account. In the worst-case scenario, this new
system could open the door to privatized censorship. The scenario
mentioned above would become more and more commonplace if courts
continue to ignore the massive amount of direct control that social media
platforms have over the speech of their users. Thus, the need for a different
rule becomes increasingly necessary for the protection of individuals’ First
Amendment rights.
C.

Problematic Privacy Concerns

Even setting aside the concerns around the ever-changing terms of service,
the current privacy policies of these social media sites present major concerns
for users’ privacy. These issues highlight the central reason for social media’s
existence, which is the respective companies’ desire to make a profit. These
companies can do this in several ways. Facebook generally uses its platform

161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Terms of Service, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/terms.php (last visited Oct.
27, 2018).
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to sell advertising space and collect user data to sell to third parties.166 For
Twitter, a vast majority of its revenue comes from advertising spaces, while
the remaining revenue comes from data licensing and users paying Twitter
to promote their tweets.167 These ways of generating revenue, however, open
the door to serious privacy concerns for the platform’s users.
In 2018, the policies of both Twitter and Facebook recently came under
serious scrutiny. In that same year, Facebook faced allegations of major
privacy leaks and the release of users’ data.168 A political data firm, Cambridge
Analytica, was able to acquire the “identities, friend networks, and ‘likes’” of
over 50 million Facebook users.169 This data assisted Cambridge in its
advertising and developing of tools to influence the behavior of American
voters.170 The data also assisted some politicians who used the data in their
campaigning to determine where to play political ads.171 In an odd twist, the
data leak allegedly assisted President Trump in his successful campaign run
for the 2016 presidency.172
This breach of users’ information and privacy shocked the nation. In
response, both the national and international legal community began to look
into the matter.173 In the United States, the CEO of Facebook, Mark
Zuckerberg, was called to testify before Congress regarding the data “leak.”174
These allegations have led to sanctions placed on the platform for the breach
166.
Rakesh Sharma, How Facebook Makes Money, INVESTOPEDIA, https://
www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/120114/how-does-facebook-fb-make-money.asp (last
updated June 25, 2019).
167. Brian Beers, How Does Twitter Make Money?, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.
investopedia.com/ask/answers/120114/how-does-twitter-twtr-make-money.asp (last updated
Apr. 23, 2019).
168. Jim Waterson, UK Fines Facebook £500,000 for Failing To Protect User Data,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/oct/25/facebookfined-uk-privacy-access-user-data-cambridge-analytica.
169. Kevin Granville, Facebook and Cambridge Analytica: What You Need To Know as
Fallout Widens, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/
technology/facebook-cambridge-analytica-explained.html.
170. Id.
171. Rahul Rathi, Effect of Cambridge Analytica’s Facebook Ads on the 2016 US
Presidential Election, Towards Data Science (Jan. 13, 2019), https://towardsdatascience.com/
effect-of-cambridge-analyticas-facebook-ads-on-the-2016-us-presidential-election-dacb5462
155d.
172. Id.
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in users’ privacy; specifically, the UK Information Commissioner’s Office
ruled that Facebook must pay £500,000 for “fail[ing] to sufficiently protect
the privacy of its users before, during and after the unlawful processing of
this data.”175 Italy imposed its own sanctions on Facebook by fining the
company €1 million.176 Additionally, the Federal Trade Commission charged
Facebook with several violations of a previous settlement agreement between
the FTC and Facebook.177 In particular, the FTC alleged that the platform lied
to consumers regarding its control over private information and information
shared with other companies.178 These allegations led to a record-breaking
settlement between the FTC and Facebook in the amount of $5 billion.179 In
the future, Ireland may also impose sanctions on Facebook in the amount of
$1.6 billion for its violation of users’ privacy in the wake of the Cambridge
Analytica scandal.180
Twitter is currently facing similar privacy troubles in the French legal
system.181 In August of 2018, a Paris court held that Twitter’s privacy policy
violated its users’ privacy.182 Instead of focusing on a particular breach of
privacy with a company like Cambridge Analytica, the Paris court focused
exclusively on the language of Twitter’s 256 terms of service.183 The court
ruled that the terms users are forced to accept are “abusive” and allow users’
data (particularly users’ uploaded photos) to be “commercially exploited” by
Twitter.184 This led the court to sanction Twitter by requiring it to change its
small print.185
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Even setting aside the intentional invasions of users’ privacy, social media
platforms are prone to inadvertently share users’ private information without
consent. Recently, Twitter admitted to two recent “issues” where users’
private data was shared to advertising companies.186 These leaks allowed
companies to potentially view users’ data including their country code,
whether and when users engaged with advertisements, and information
about the ad itself.187 This announcement came on the heels of an
announcement that another “issue” revealed many users’ tweets to the public,
even if users wished to keep their tweets private.188
Privacy concerns continue to plague social networking sites. While
America and the rest of the world are left to determine how to protect
consumers from these massive breaches in privacy, courts are left to grapple
with the issues of private companies’ rights and rights of the individuals using
these websites. Unfortunately, when it comes to the law of public fora on
these sites, courts have paid little to no attention to these concerns. Instead,
both the Fourth Circuit and the Second Circuit focused on the surface issues
of superficial control and government authority. This misses the bigger, and
more troubling, issues that social media can present to its users. Thus, courts
should take these privacy concerns into account when determining the
classification of government-run social media accounts.
IV. ALTERNATIVE THEORY
The aforementioned concerns lead to one conclusion: it is illogical for a
public forum to exist on such a privatized and legally tumultuous platform.
At the same time, both government officials and their constituents should
still be able to take advantage of the positive benefits offered by these
platforms. While the comment sections to social media platforms present
odd issues involving the First Amendment, the foundational ability of a user
to create a post on their own account still provides public officials a means of
directly informing the general public of their policy stances and any relevant
updates. Thus, it is vital that the courts balance the benefits of social media
use with the burdens of the legal theory that must be applied.
A.

Perspective

While the discussion thus far has centered around the drawbacks of
government use of social media, it is important to not lose sight of the many
186. An Issue with Your Settings Choices Related to Ads on Twitter, TWITTER,
https://help.twitter.com/en/ads-settings (last visited Sept. 6, 2019).
187. Id.
188. An Issue with Protected Tweets on Twitter for Android, TWITTER (Jan. 17, 2019),
https://help.twitter.com/en/protected-tweets-android (last visited Sept. 6, 2019).
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benefits that this use has on politics in general. It is true that the comment
section of social media can present issues. However, this is not to say that
government entities should stay away from social media—quite the contrary.
Social media sites have become a way for representatives to quickly and
directly inform the public of any declarations, updates, or to give their
constituents a closer look into the political process. This serves as valuable
insight for the public as a whole. In fact, other legal scholars have identified
several positive benefits for government use of social media platforms. In one
of the most comprehensive looks at social media in the public fora, Professor
Lyrissa Lidsky argues that the government should be incentivized to use
platforms like Twitter and Facebook to connect with the general public.189
In her article Public Forum 2.0, Professor Lidsky identified six societal
benefits that will incur from the use of these platforms.190 First, officials will
have direct access to their constituents.191 Second, the audience that will be
reached generally would not have been reached without the platform.192
Third, these pages have the potential to build a community among those that
follow the government official.193 Fourth, these pages allow officials to
accumulate feedback from their followers so that they may better understand
the needs of their constituents.194 Fifth, using social media to communicate
with the masses is faster, cheaper, and more direct than most other forms of
communication available to public officials.195 Finally, social media allows
government officials to directly respond and interact with members of the
community.196 Professor Lidsky observed that this benefit in particular is “a
key impetus behind government use of social media” since public officials
want to seem more responsive to their constituents.197 Unfortunately, when
all of the benefits are analyzed in practice, the fourth and sixth benefits
identified are both subject to the control of site owners.
Not only does government use of social media benefit the government
officials using the platform, but it also often benefits political constituents.198
“Citizens have an interest in receiving government information quickly,
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cheaply, and without distortion.”199 However, it is here that Professor Lidsky
makes an odd assertion. She argues that social media sites “have the potential
to advance the First Amendment values of free speech, free association, and
the petitioning of government for redress of grievances.”200 However, such
advancement is entirely contingent on the private company that owns the
forum. First Amendment privileges are in no way guaranteed on private
Internet platforms where the company restricts the content of its users’
speech. Therein lies the true issue with social media sites: free speech is not
guaranteed on social media platforms. Instead, it can be (and is) consistently
restricted by the company through the reserved right to change their terms
of service.201 There are no speech rights on private social networking sites.
Even Professor Lidsky concedes that the confusion involved in the public
forum doctrine can massively deter public officials’ use of social networking
sites as a way to interact with the general public.202 Unfortunately, this
confusion and lack of precedent also creates several issues for courts to
wrestle with, as evidenced in both Knight and Davison. Despite this fact, as
previously stated, governmental use of social media should not be
discouraged; there are far too many benefits for public figures to outright
forego its use. However, the issue arises in the precedent that the rulings in
Knight and Davison set—particularly by setting the precedent that a private
company may exercise such intimate control over the discourse that takes
place in a “public forum.” On the other hand, there are still benefits that
Professor Lidsky identified that can exist without the use of the platform’s
comment section.203 These benefits should be fostered. Of course, for this to
happen, the present rule must be significantly modified to accommodate for
the benefits of social media use and the limitation of private control.
B.

Proposal

When the benefits and burdens of the Knight and Davison rule are
weighed, it becomes apparent that the negative burdens far outweigh the
potential benefits. Courts must recognize that social media platforms cannot
be relied upon to give their users the freedom of speech guaranteed by the
First Amendment due to the inherent nature of private companies and the
speech restrictions that they may constitutionally place on their users. At this
point, courts continue to struggle with the application of the law in a rapidly
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evolving digital age where the Internet has become central to the lives of
many. Thus, it is vital that courts take a more thoughtful approach to the
issue.
Therefore, in order to protect the direct communication of public officials
and the private interests of the public, government-run social media accounts
should not be considered a public forum. With so much uncertainty
revolving around the First Amendment as applied to the Internet and social
media accounts, it would be unwise to create such a significant and
potentially devastating rule in an area that courts do not fully understand. A
rushed and ill-informed rule could have lasting implications on all public
fora, even those public fora that do not exist in the Internet. Instead, until
such a time that social media posts are not visible to those without an
account, posts made by public officials should be seen only as public
declarations. These declarations, even when made on social media platforms,
would fall under the category of government speech.
The Second Circuit and the Fourth Circuit were correct on this point: the
posts made by government officials on their social media accounts are
properly classified as government speech.204 Even though the platform itself
is a public forum, the government officials may still utilize it to further their
own speech.205 This point can exist independent of the public forum
analysis.206 That being said, it would be entirely logical to permit the
government to use the platforms for the purpose of exercising government
speech. Public officials may still use social media to update their followers
and inform the general public and their constituents of the policy moves that
they are making. This portion of the courts’ analysis should remain
unchanged while the remainder of the analysis should be modified so that
there is no First Amendment protection for individuals posting comments
on social media posts made by the public officials.
C.

Benefits of the Alternative

Without the framework created in Knight and Davison, there are still
significant benefits gained through government use of social media. For
example, public officials will still have direct access to their constituents,
reach a wider audience, and communicate to the masses in a faster and more
cost-effective way.207 Further, the general public will receive information in a
204. Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 239 (2d
Cir. 2019); Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666, 686 (4th Cir. 2019).
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much more direct and easy-to-access manner.208 While the comments and
direct replies to posts made by public officials would not be legally protected,
it is important to recognize the other benefits that ensue from the proposed
rule: the officials may still use social media to directly disseminate
information to the public. This system would greatly reduce the risk of either
private censorship or excessive government regulation of private institutions.
It is unfortunate that the proposed alternative does not guarantee direct
back-and-forth communication between government officials and the
general public. On the other hand, this alternative does not completely close
the door for users to comment on public officials’ posts. The only difference
between the Knight rule and the proposed rule is that there would be no
guaranteed right to comment on the public official’s posts. However, users
are already not guaranteed the right to comment on posts or even have an
account on social media platforms in the first place. Even before the Knight
rule, users have always been, and will continue to be, subject to the
restrictions that private companies place on their users. Such is the nature of
social media and the private marketplace. This proposed rule, however,
would not grant these companies the ability to exercise authority over the
speech of individuals whose First Amendment rights are supposed to be
protected. This outcome is far more preferable to the outcome of the Knight
rule, as its drawbacks pale in comparison to the potential detriment of
privatized censorship.
V. CONCLUSION
The aforementioned concerns lead to one conclusion: it is illogical for a
public forum to exist on a social media platform. Instead, it is far more
reasonable to allow public officials to use such a platform as a way to
promulgate government speech and keep the general public informed.
Adopting the rule used in Knight would set a dangerous precedent while also
transforming privately owned and regulated platforms into a quasi-public
forum subject to private censorship. Thus, government-run social media
accounts and their posts should be relegated to the dissemination of
informative public declarations. This would protect the public’s freedom of
speech in public fora from the dangerous potential of censorship by
companies that operate outside of the bounds of the First Amendment.
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